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Abstract
In The Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically
low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search
effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a
sanction in the form of a temporarily benefit reduction can be imposed.
This paper investigates the effect of such sanctions on the transition from
welfare to work using a unique set of rich administrative data on welfare
recipients in The Netherlands. We find that the imposition of sanctions
substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work.
We also describe the other determinants of the transition from welfare to
work.
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1 Introduction
In many OECD countries, the rate at which welfare recipients leave welfare is
typically very low, even though welfare programs differ substantially between
countries. In the U.S. it is typically used to support single-parent households,
whereas in European countries it is also often used to support long-term unem-
ployed workers. i Welfare (or “social assistance”) then acts as a safety net for
those unemployed workers who are not entitled (anymore) to any other social
security benefits like unemployment insurance or disability benefits. Whatever
their designs, the current welfare systems are subject to criticisms, and policy
makers see a need to restructure it, in particular in order to stimulate the transi-
tion from welfare to work (see for example Gueron, 1990, and Moffitt, 1992). In
principle, a large range of policy measures is available to prevent the unemployed
from becoming dependent on welfare and to stimulate and assist the long-term
unemployed in their search for jobs. Examples are subsidized employment for
youth and long-term unemployed, training and schooling programs, special pub-
lic employment services, and punitive benefit reductions.
In this paper we evaluate the effect of sanctions that are imposed if the welfare
recipient does not comply with the minimum job search requirements and rules
of registration laid out by the welfare agency. In particular, we evaluate the
effect of a sanction on the duration until exit into work. A sanction consists of
a temporary reduction of the welfare benefits level. The duration and size of the
reduction depend on the nature of the infringement. Frequently used reasons for
imposing sanctions are insufficient job search activity, fraud, unnecessary job loss
and lack of willingness to participate in education or training programs (below
we examine this in more detail).
Although income support has always been the primary aim of social security
in general and welfare in particular, there is an increasing interest in stimulating
welfare recipients to find a job. It is commonly felt that the Dutch social security
system imposes a heavy burden on the economy and therefore a strong policy
toward abuse is necessary to maintain support for at least the essential features of
this system. The use of sanctions by welfare agencies to stimulate re-employment
or prevent fraud is relatively new. Before 1992, sanctions were hardly ever used.
By the mid-nineties, about 5% of the welfare recipients in a given year received
a sanction. It should be noted that, in The Netherlands, the state guarantees
.
‘European labor markets are characterized by a low inflow into unemployment and a high
average duration of unemployment (see Bean, 1994, and Layard, Nickel1 and Jackman,  1991,
for surveys).
the provision of a minimum income to each citizen in urgent financial need. This
effectively restricts the magnitude of sanctions in welfare, and indeed it creates
an upper bound on the harshness of a system with sanctions. As a result, the
duration and size of the benefit reductions are relatively low in comparison to
those for unemployment insurance (UI) recipients. Most welfare sanctions are
only for one or two months and the maximum reduction of the welfare benefit is
2 0 % .
It is important to stress that there is a difference between (1) the effect of
actually imposing a sanction and (2) the effect of having a welfare system with
sanctions as opposed to a welfare system without sanctions. The second effect,
which is a preventive or ex-ante effect, is positive if the mere existence of a welfare
system with sanctions stimulates the transitions from welfare to work. Our data
are from a world with sanctions, so our reduced-form empirical analysis of micro
duration data can not be used to evaluate the magnitude of this ex-ante effect.
Concerning the ex-post effect, the benefit reduction that is involved probably
makes the individual more prone to accept jobs and to search more intensively.
However, a sanction is more than just a mechanic temporary reduction in benefits.
The sanction is induced by a failure to oblige certain job search requirements,
and the welfare agency will motivate its decision to the individual. Furthermore,
individuals are closely monitored after a sanction, so they have an incentive to
comply with the search requirements in order to prevent additional punishments.
All this is likely to increase the search intensity of the individual from the moment
at which the sanction is imposed onwards. 2 In sum, imposition of a sanction is
expected to increase the exit rate out of welfare into work.
A substantial part of the literature on the effects of back-to-work policy pro-
grams focuses on the effect of program participation on future earnings (Heckman,
Smith and Clements, 1997) or on cost-benefit analysis of such programs (Bell and
Orr, 1994). Some studies focus on the effect on the transition rate from unemploy-
ment to employment, correcting for selection bias in a non-experimental context
(see Bonnal,  Fougere  and SQandon,  1997, and Gritz, 1993, who focus on training
programs).3  The empirical analysis in the present study closely follows the ap-
‘There is evidence that an increase in search intensity increases the transition rate from
unemployment to employment (see Devine and Kiefer, 1991, for a survey). Gorter and Kalb
(1996) and Dolton  and O’Neill  (1996) estimate the effect of interviews that are supposed to
provide advice and counseling to UI recipients. Both find a significant and lasting effect on
-the transition rate from unemployment to employment. Meyer (1995) finds significant effects
of similar treatments in experiments across the U.S. (“search experiments”).
3See  also Cockx  and Ridder (1996) who use a natural-experiment methodology to examine
the effect of subsidized employment on the exit rate out of welfare in Belgium, and Ham and
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preach  developed in Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997),  who analyze
the effect of sanctions in UI on the exit rate out of unemployment.4  The main
problem in any empirical analysis of sanctions concerns the endogenous selection
involved in the imposition of sanctions. It is clear that sanctions are imposed by
the welfare agency in response to the behavior of the welfare recipient. Welfare
recipients who get a sanction are most likely different from other welfare recipi-
ents. Neglecting this gives a biased estimate of the sanction effect. Therefore, we
model both process by which welfare recipients get a sanction and the process by
which they leave unemployment. The two processes are allowed to be interde-
pendent by way of their unobserved determinants and by way of a direct effect of
a realized sanction on the transition rate to employment (this approach is similar
to that used by Bonnal,  Fougere  and Serandon,  1997, and Gritz, 1993). We allow
the rate at which a sanction is imposed to depend on observed explanatory vari-
ables, on the elapsed unemployment duration, and on unobserved determinants
(we use a Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) specification). For the duration
dependence we take a flexible piecewise constant specification. The exit rate out
of unemployment into employment is modeled in a similar way, with the quali-
fication that one of its explanatory variables depends on the actual state of the
sanction process. We identify the causal effect of a sanction on the transition rate
from welfare to work by exploiting the information in the timing of the events we
observe (imposition of a sanction and/or exit to work).
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a detailed description
of the Dutch welfare system. We discuss the eligibility requirements for receiving
a welfare benefit, the guidelines that a recipient must comply with, the sanctions
for noncompliance, and the way sanctions are actually imposed. In Section 3
we discuss our model which is based on job search theory. Section 4 discusses
the unique database we use to estimate the model. This database covers all
unemployed individuals who started to collect welfare benefits in Rotterdam in
1994 and contains information about them until they left the welfare system or
until October 1996, whichever was later. In Section 5 we present the estimation
results, and we perform some sensitivity analyses. Section 6 concludes.
LaLonde  (1996) who use experimental data to examine the effect of training on the transition
rate to work for AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) claimants.
40bviously  the populations of UI and welfare recipients are very different in terms of their
background and their opportunities. UI recipients have better labor market prospects, since
they necessarily have a substantial amount of recent work experience. This may make them
more sensitive to financial stimuli. On the other hand, UI benefits are usually higher than
welfare benefits, and this may make the UI recipients less sensitive to such stimuli. See also
Section 2.
2 Welfare recipients in The Netherlands
2.1 Entitlement
In this section we describe some institutional aspects of the Dutch welfare (or
“social assistance”) system in the mid-nineties. It is not our intention to give an
exhaustive description of the system. Instead, we explain the basic structure and
highlight aspects that are relevant for our purposes. We rely on some publications
in Dutch on welfare in The Netherlands (Angenent, Bommelje  and Schep, 1993,
1994; Angenent and Den Heeten, 1995).
The Netherlands has about 16 million inhabitants of which 6 million are em-
ployed workers. The aim of welfare is to support people without income who
are not entitled to any other social security benefits. In addition, the individual
must (i) be legally allowed to stay in The Netherlands, and (ii) be over 18 years.
In 1994, 485.000 individuals without work received welfare benefits. Of these,
320,000 are counted as unemployed; these have a formal obligation to search for
a job. The remaining 165,000 individuals received welfare benefits without an
obligation to search for a job. Of the latter group, 55% belongs to a single parent
household with children aged below 12 years (welfare for the latter type of indi-
viduals is similar to AFDC in the U.S.). In the sequel we ignore the recipients
who do not have an obligation to search for a job, since both the rate of getting a
sanction and the rate of finding a job are determined in a very different way than
for the other recipients. For simplicity we will use the term “welfare recipient” to
denote just those recipients who have an obligation to search for a job and who
are counted as unemployed.
The welfare benefits level can be decomposed into a basic level and a series of
bonuses. The basic level is fully determined by the household composition and
by the extent to which other sources of income and assets are available. Thus,
welfare benefits are means-tested. If the applicant has a partner with a sufficiently
high income out of labor, or if the applicant has a sufficiently high amount of
assets (like a house), then in general he does not qualify for welfare. Concerning
the level of benefits, one may distinguish between four household categories.5  In
1995, the net benefits level for a two-parent family (i.e., a married couple with or
without children) was about 1800 Dutch guilders per month. For a single-parent
family, this was about 1600 guilders. Finally, for a single individual aged over 23
it was about 1250 guilders, whereas for a single individual aged below 23 it was
about 900 guilders.
5There  are a few other cases that are less common; see e.g. Van Andel and BommeljC  (1996).
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Municipalities have power to provide bonuses on top of the basic benefits level.
For example, some municipalities pay bonuses for the use of sports facilities and
public transport, or for health-related expenses like glasses. The types of bonuses,
the rules on entitlement to a bonus and the levels of the bonuses vary considerably
across different municipalities.6
In 1994, about 35% of the welfare recipients had been collecting welfare bene-
fits for an uninterrupted duration of more than 3 years. Of the welfare recipients,
68% is single, 25% is married and only 7% belongs to a single parent family.
Welfare recipients often have low skills. The fraction of individuals with primary
education is 15% for the whole labor force but 35% for the welfare recipients.
The age structure of the population of welfare recipients is about the same in the
labor force.
One may distinguish between two types of individuals among the welfare
recipients. The first are workers who enter unemployment after leaving full-time
education. The second are job losers, i.e. workers with a history of labor force
attachment. The workers in this group have either run out of eligibility for
UI benefits or never collected UI benefits because they did not meet eligibility
criteria at the start of their unemployment spell. The maximum duration of UI
depends on the employment history of the individual and ranges from 6 months
to 4.5 years. Note that the individuals entering welfare from UI are a selective
sample of the inflow into UI. On average, the more disadvantaged individuals
eventually move to welfare. In the inflow into welfare, the group of school leavers
is much smaller than the group of job losers (10% versus 90%). There is also a
large difference between the exit rates of the two groups (65% and 35% within
a year, respectively; it should be noted that most welfare recipients under 21
years participate in youth job guarantee programs after having been on welfare
for 6 months). In this study we restrict attention to the second group of welfare
recipients, the job losers. These are more important both from a quantitative
point of view (a large fraction of the inflow into welfare) and from a qualitative
point of view (a small exit rate out of welfare), and it is obvious that the behavior
in the two groups cannot be captured in a single model. In the remainder of the
paper we refer to this second group as the welfare recipients, thereby omitting
the qualification of them being job losers.
6This  provides an incentive for welfare recipients to move to other municipalities. However,
- the housing market for lower income households is highly regulated, and in many municipalities
the average waiting time for a house is very long, in particular if there are no household members
with a job in that municipality. Since we only have data on recipients in the municipality of
Rotterdam, we cannot exploit this feature to define a natural experiment.
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A welfare recipient has several obligations in order to remain eligible for a
benefit: he has to (i) prevent unnecessary job loss, (ii) take actions to prevent
him from staying unemployed, so he has to search for a job and accept appropriate
job offers, register at the public employment office, participate in education and
training, etc., and (iii) keep the welfare agency informed about everything that
is relevant to the payment of welfare benefits.
Although welfare recipients are obliged to search for a job, not all of them
seem to be willing to work. A survey on attitudes of welfare recipients reveals
that about 10% of the welfare recipients state that they do not want to have a
job. The 90% that does want to work is not always eager to find a job (Angenent,
Bommelje and Schep, 1994). Only 55% indicate that they are actively searching
for a job. Furthermore, a lot of workers only accept a job if the net wage is at
least 250 Dutch guilders per month above the welfare benefits level. Finally, half
of the welfare recipients indicate that they do not want to move if that is required
for a new job.
2.2 Sanctions
Sometimes sanctions are imposed to punish welfare recipients because of ad-
ministrative reasons like returning late from holiday, filling in forms incorrectly,
etcetera. Nevertheless, the main reason to impose sanctions is noncompliance
with job search guidelines. Previous studies on the Dutch welfare benefit sys-
tem argued that sanctions can not affect the transition rate from welfare to work
(Angenent, Bommelje and Schep, 1993). Their argument runs as follows. Since
welfare recipients have a weak labor market position, sanctions only induce ap-
parent changes in behavior. Sanctioned welfare recipients or recipients at risk
signal an increased search intensity while in reality they do not make an addi-
tional effort. For example, a welfare recipient may show the welfare officer fake
application letters. Or, the welfare recipient may perform “negative” applica-
tions, by acting during an application interview in such a way as to minimize
the probability of being hired. The worker transmits signals of lack of interest to
the employer while at the same time it appears that he complies with job search
guidelines.7
The procedure of imposing a sanction consists of two steps. In the first step,
it is established that a welfare recipient does not comply with the guidelines of
.
?A  strategy in which individuals take a job upon imposition of a sanction, and quit imme-
diately in order to make a “fresh start” in UI, would not be optimal: UI would be reduced
immediately after quitting because of “lack of action to prevent job loss” (see Abbring, Van
den Berg and Van Ours, 1997).
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the welfare agency. Information on possible offenses can come from the monthly
form a welfare recipient has to fill in, or from a conversation between an employee
of the welfare agency and the welfare recipient. It is also possible that the public
employment office informs the welfare agency about a lack of job search activity.
About 90 percent of the cases of noncompliance is established in the so-called “re-
investigation”, which is a standard procedure that usually takes place 8 months
after the start of collecting the welfare benefits. If a sanction is imposed because
of insufficient job search activity, then the welfare agency is obliged to re-examine
the job search activities of the welfare recipient within 3 months after the impo-
sition. (If a sanction is imposed for other reasons then the welfare agency is not
obliged to do so, although it often does.) Based on the outcome of the renewed
examination, the welfare agency may decide to renew the sanction or punish the
welfare recipient with a higher sanction. Our data show that in practice sanctions
are almost never renewed.
In the second step of the sanction procedure, it is decided whether or not
the noncompliance will be punished. Noncompliance does not always lead to a
sanction. Local or district governments are responsible for the payment of welfare
benefits, but the national government has set binding rules and procedures con-
cerning the imposition of sanctions. However, these rules do not imply that the
sanctions are imposed automatically or fully objectively. Welfare employees have
some discretion to interpret the rules. According to the procedures, the decision
to impose a sanction on a particular welfare recipient is taken by the local wel-
fare employee after consulting a so called “decision maker”. The decision maker
checks the proposal to make sure that all the right legal steps in the procedure
have been taken. The employee of the welfare agency takes the state of the local
labor market into account when deciding whether or not a sanction should be
imposed. Furthermore, conditional on noncompliance with the guidelines, the
decision to impose a sanction also depends on characteristics of the welfare recip-
ients like attitude, appearance and motivation (Angenent, Bommelje  and Schep,
1993). These are all characteristics that are unobserved by the researcher trying
to investigate the effect of sanctions. A 1992 investigation of 3500 personal files
shows that, even though noncompliance was established for approximately 10%
of the welfare recipients, only about 5% did get a sanction. Noncompliance is
more common among young welfare recipients. And, conditional on noncompli-
ance, younger welfare recipients are more likely to get a sanction imposed. This.
may be because of the better labor market position of younger workers. Lower
educated workers more often do not obey the search rules, but conditional on
this they are less likely than higher educated workers to get a sanction imposed.
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Again, the bad labor market position of lower educated workers may explain the
difference. In Section 5 we examine whether these results are confirmed by our
multivariate analysis.
The period between the establishment of noncompliance and the imposition
of a sanction is usually 1 to 2 months. In some cases it may take years before non-
compliance is established. This may happen if there are only postal investigations
with respect to the behavior of the welfare recipient.
Although sanctions did exist before 1992, they were hardly ever imposed. By
instruction of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the welfare agencies
started to use sanctions as an instrument to stimulate re-employment of welfare
recipients and as an instrument against fraud8 at the end of 1992.
Now let us examine the two most important features of a sanction: its magni-
tude and its duration. These depend first of all on the nature of the infringement
and the extent to which a welfare recipient can be held responsible for the in-
fringement. There are general guidelines for the imposition of sanctions, but
again the welfare agency may take individual circumstances of the welfare recip-
ient into account. As explained in Section 1, the magnitude and the duration of
the benefits reductions are limited. The reduction is either 5%,  10% or 20% of
the benefits level. The duration of the reduction can be up to 6 months, but is
usually only 1 or 2 months. According to the official guidelines there are four
categories of sanctions: (1) If a welfare recipient does not register or renew his
registration at a public employment office, a benefit reduction of 5% during 1
month is recommended. (2) A sanction of 10% during 1 month is recommended
if a welfare recipient insufficiently searches for a job, neglects appointments at the
welfare agency and does not cooperate in the search for appropriate training pro-
grams. (3) If the welfare recipient’s behavior interferes with searching for a job or
if he refuses training, a sanction can be imposed with a reduction of 20% during
1 month. (4) A benefit reduction of 20% during 2 months is recommended if the
welfare recipient refuses an appropriate job offer or did not prevent unnecessary
job loss prior to entering welfare.
‘If a welfare recipient withholds information e.g. in order to get higher welfare benefits,
then this is considered as fraud. Depending on the size of the fraud the welfare agency decides
whether a sanction should be applied or whether legal prosecution is necessary.
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3 The model
3.1 A theoretical framework
In this section we present the model that we estimate in the empirical analysis.
The empirical model specification is motivated by a theoretical job search model
framework in which punitive sanctions are incorporated. The latter model frame-
work has been developed by Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997). Here
we merely sketch it (taking into account the modifications due to the fact that
we consider welfare rather than UI), and we list its most important properties.
Subsequently, we discuss the empirical model, and at the end of the section we
discuss the parameterization  of our model.
The point of departure is the basic job search model with endogenous search
effort s as presented by e.g. Mortensen (1986). In this framework, sanctions can
be incorporated as temporary benefit reductions, which are imposed at a certain
rate if the job search intensity s is under some threshold value. It is useful to
distinguish between sanctions as an institutional aspect of the environment of the
individual, and the actual imposition of a sanction for an individual. Concerning
the former, one may argue that the mere threat of a sanction should suffice to
prevent it from ever being enforced. It is clear that the data contradict such a
view. Alternatively, one may argue that the moment of occurrence of a sanc-
tion is perfectly foreseen by the benefits recipient and is taken into account in
determining his choices. The data and the results of this paper as well as the in-
stitutional aspects of the welfare system (see the previous section) contradict this
view as well. There is variation across individuals in the strictness with which the
rules are applied, and presumably there is a certain degree of randomness in this
(this is confirmed by field research; see the references in the previous section).
We conjecture that the individual does not exactly know the rules that he has
to comply with, and that he does not exactly know what type of behavior will
generate a sanction, and even if he knows he is under risk then he does not know
when a sanction will be imposed. It is however plausible that the individual does
know the relation between his behavior and the probability that a sanction will
be imposed. Some individuals will be more willing to take the risk of being given
a sanction than others (e.g. because they have a higher non-pecuniary utility of
being unemployed). We therefore assume that, for an unemployed individual who
. has not yet been punished, there is a rate p(s) at which a sanction is imposed,
with p(s) decreasing in s. The individual does know the shape of p(s) but he does
not know in advance when a sanction is imposed. It may actually be realistic
to have p(s) = 0 for all s exceeding a certain threshold value. This is because a
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sanction policy is backed up by explicit minimum-requirement rules.
Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997) derive the following three main
results for this model. First, at the moment at which a sanction is imposed,
the transition rate from unemployment to employment jumps upward. Thus the
actual imposition of a sanction has no effect on this transition rate before the
moment at which a sanction is imposed. However, once a sanction is imposed,
it has a positive effect on this transition rate. The latter is for two underlying
reasons. First, the benefits reduction generates a reduction in the reservation
wage and an increase of the search intensity. Secondly, punished individuals are
closely monitored, so they have an incentive to comply with the search require-
ments in order to prevent additional punishments. This also increases the search
intensity. (Our data show that recidivism is rare; see Section 4.) Note that if the
individual search intensity is close to a physical maximum and the probability of
job acceptance by the individual is almost equal to one, then the transition rate
from unemployment to employment is mostly determined by the selection and
job offer behavior of employers and by the technology of the matching process.
In that case, the effect of a sanction on this transition rate is small.
The second main result is that the transition rate from unemployment to
employment is smaller in a system without sanctions than it is in the system
with sanctions, in the time interval before the sanction is actually imposed. This
holds for all individuals who have a positive probability of getting a sanction in
the latter system (including those who by chance did not have sanctions imposed
during unemployment). As noted in the introduction, our empirical analysis
cannot be used to evaluate the effect on unemployment durations of having a
welfare system with sanctions vis-a-vis a welfare system without sanctions.
The third result is that both the transition rate from unemployment to em-
ployment and the rate at which a sanction arrives depend on the same set of
personal characteristics. This is because both depend on the individual’s search
intensity, which in turn depends on all determinants of the individual’s decision
problem. This has an obvious implication for the empirical analysis in case of
unobserved heterogeneity amongst individuals, since it creates a spurious relation
between the duration until a sanction arrives and the duration of unemployment
(this is the selectivity problem discussed in Section 1). Note that a similar spu-
rious relation is created if the policy parameters of the sanction rate itself differ
across individuals in a way that is not observed by the researcher.
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3.2 The empirical model
It is useful to start this subsection with a brief outline of the type of data we have.
Our database consists of all individuals who started collecting welfare benefits in
1994 in Rotterdam. For each individual we know the precise duration of welfare,
unless there was right-censoring at the end of the observation period, which is
October 1996. We also observe the exit destination, which is usually employment.
Other possibilities are: leaving the city, getting married or stopping to apply for
welfare benefits for unknown reasons. Exit to such destinations is treated as
independent right-censoring of the duration until exit to work. We do not have
any information about what happens afterwards. For each individual we know
whether or not he was punished with a sanction, and, if so, we know the exact
moment of imposition. We also observe the length of the period during which the
benefits were reduced and in most cases we also know the magnitude of benefit
reduction. We will only use this additional information in the sensitivity analyses
of Subsection 5.2.
The empirical model we use is similar to that of Abbring, Van den Berg and
Van Ours (1997). Consider individuals receiving welfare benefits for t units of
time. We assume that differences in transition rates from welfare to work can be
characterized by the observed characteristics X,  the unobserved characteristics ZI,,
the elapsed welfare duration itself, and a variable indicating whether a sanction
has already been imposed during the spell. We assume z to be constant and 21,
to be independent of z. Let t, be the moment at which a sanction is imposed on
the individual and I(t, < t) the variable indicating whether a sanction has been
imposed (I(.) is the indicator function).
After imposition, a sanction is assumed to have a permanent multiplicative
effect on the transition rate, equal for all types of individuals. In addition, we
abstract from multiple sanctions in a single welfare spell. These assumptions are
obviously rather strong. We will relax some of them in the sensitivity analysis
of Subsection 5.2, although, as we will see, the data impose restrictions on what
can be identified.
The transition rate from welfare to work at t conditional on z, v, and t, is
denoted by 0, (t J x, v,,  t,)  and is assumed to have the familiar Mixed Proportional
Hazard (MPH) specification
Wlx, vu7  t,> = x,(t) exp(x’P,  + 6 - I@, < t) + 21J
in which x,(t)  represents the individual duration dependence. Let t, be the
realized duration when leaving to employment. The conditional density function
1 1
For an individual who has received welfare benefits for t units of time and
on whom no sanction has been imposed, the sanction rate at t conditional on
observed and unobserved characteristics x and V,  is denoted by e,(tl~,  vS)  and is
also assumed to have the MPH specification
where x is assumed to be constant over time and independent of 21,.  If t, denotes
the moment of imposing the first sanction, the conditional sanction duration
density function of tsJx,  ZJ,  is
Now consider the joint distribution of t, and t,.  Conditional on Z, ZI,  and
21 s, the only possible relation between the variables t, and t,  is the relation by
way of the direct effect of a sanction on the transition rate from welfare to work.
This means that if S = 0 then, conditional on Z, the variables t, and t,  are only
dependent if V, and ZJ,  are dependent. In case of independence of w, and ZJ,,  we
would have a standard duration model for t, in which I(t, < t) can be treated
as a time-varying regressor that is orthogonal to the unobserved heterogeneity
term 2),. However, if V, and v, are not independent, inference on t,lx,  t,  has
to be based on t,,  t,lx.  Let G(v,,  us)  be the joint distribution function of the
unobserved characteristics v,,  21,. The joint density function of t,,  t,  conditional
on x equals
It is straightforward to derive the individual contributions to the likelihood
function from this joint density function (note the recursive nature of the expres-
. sion in the integral above). The use of a flow sample of welfare spells implies
that we do not have any initial conditions problems. The right-censoring in the
data is exogenous and is therefore solved in a straightforward manner within the
hazard rate framework.
1 2
cI
The intuition of the identification of this model is as follows. The data can be
broken into two parts: (i) a competing risk part for the duration until a welfare
recipient either finds  a job or gets a sanction imposed, whichever comes first, and
(ii) the residual duration from the moment of imposition of a sanction until exit to
work. From Heckman  and Honor6  (1989) it follows that under general conditions
the whole model except for S is identified from the data corresponding to the
competing risk part. Subsequently, S is identified from the data corresponding
to part (ii) of the model. Basically, the timing of the consecutive events of
imposition of a sanction and exit into work is informative on the presence of the
causal effect of a sanction. The nonparametric identification of treatment effects
in duration models like this is discussed at length in Abbring and Van den Berg
(1997).
3 . 3  Parameterization
For the duration dependence functions and the bivariate unobserved heterogene-
ity distribution we take the most flexible specifications used to date. We take
both A,(t)  and J!,(t)  to have a piecewise constant specification,
4Ct>  =exP  (jzg,...&jIj  (t)) i = u,s
where j is a subscript for time intervals and Ij(t) are time-varying dummy vari-
ables that are one in consecutive time intervals. Note that with an increasing
number of time intervals any duration dependence pattern can be approximated
arbitrarily closely. By now it is well known that duration dependence specifica-
tions with only one parameter (like a Weibull specification) are overly restrictive
(see e.g. Lancaster, 1990).
We take the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms w, and
21,  to be multivariate discrete with two unrestricted mass-point locations for each
term. Let v:, vi, v,”  and v,b  denote the points of support of ~1,  and u,, respectively.
The associated probabilities are denoted as follows:
Pr(v, = 21:,  v, = vz) = p, Pr(v,, = 21:,  zIs  = u,“)  = p3
Pr(w,  = ZIG,  21,  = v,“)  = p, Pr(v, = vi,  1/, = u,“)  = p4
-withO<p,<1fori=1,...,4,andp4=1-pr-p2-p3.
The covariance of 21,  and zls equals
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It is easy to show that w, and V~  are independent if and only if cov(‘u,,  ZIG)  = 0.
Furthermore, the variables V,  and ZI,  are perfectly correlated if p, = p, = 0 or
p, = p, = 0.
4 The  data
Our database concerns welfare recipients in Rotterdam, which is the second
largest city of The Netherlands. At the end of 1995 Rotterdam had almost 600,000
inhabitants of which approximately 260,000 were employed workers. About 40%
of the Rotterdam population consists of immigrants or their children. There
were around 35,000 unemployed workers, which is 15% of the labor force. About
61,000 individuals were receiving some kind of social security benefit. Of these,
78% had received this benefit already for more than one year.
The database contains administrative information on all unemployed individ-
uals who started to collect welfare benefits in Rotterdam in 1994 and who were
obliged to search for a job. The full database consists of 11350 individuals. As
explained in Section 2, we exclude school leavers from the data. This reduces the
size of the database with 10%. In addition, we exclude individuals who became
eligible for welfare before 1994 but did not start to collect benefits until 1994,
individuals for which moment of inflow into welfare is equal to the moment of
outflow, individuals for which the location of the neighborhood is missing, and
individuals for which a sanction was imposed before the moment of inflow (this
can be a UI sanction that has not yet expired at the moment of transition from
UI to welfare). Finally, we exclude individuals who had a sanction imposed im-
mediately at the start of their welfare spell. The reason is that it is not possible
to identify the selectivity involved in the imposition of sanctions at the start of a
spell. Also, sanctions at the start are given for reasons related to behavior before
receiving any welfare benefits, which are very different from reasons for sanctions
during the spell. As a result, the final dataset  consists of 7978 individuals.
All information on events is daily. In 25% of the cases, information on the
magnitude of the sanction is missing, but we do not omit these cases. Unfor-
tunately, we not observe multiple welfare spells per recipient. About 2% of the
recipients have been given more than one sanction within a given welfare spell.
In the analysis we use the values of the explanatory varia.bles x at the mo-
-merit of inflow. In addition to standard personal characteristics, we include in
x a variable indicating whether the individual has ever received welfare benefits
before. The dummy variable “married” equals one in case of marriage or concu-
binage. The dummy variable “married or kids” will be used below to allow for
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interaction between the effects of marriage and children. It should be stressed
that variables that are not relevant for the welfare agency are not included in
the database. This means that we do not have information on the profession and
the level of education of the welfare recipients. Finally, Rotterdam is divided
into 12 districts, for which we include dummy variables. Note that an advantage
of using an administrative database is that the data do not suffer from selective
nonresponse or attrition from the database.
Table 1 provides some statistics of the data set of 7978 individuals. Before
October 1996, 39% of our sample has left welfare in order to work. Since some
of the welfare recipients were “exposed to the risk” of leaving the welfare system
since January 1994, while others entered in December 1994, it is difficult to
draw conclusions from this number. Nevertheless, we can get a first impression
of differences between individuals by comparing such probabilities for different
groups. About 41% of our sample is younger than 25 years when entering the
welfare system. Of these, 47% exited from the welfare system before October
1996. About 8% of the workers in the sample is older than 45 years. Of this group
only 21% left the welfare system before October 1996. The exit probabilities of
males and females and of unmarried and married welfare recipients are about the
same. The exit probabilities of non-Dutch recipients, recurrent recipients, single
recipients and recipients with children are lower than those of their counterparts.
About 14% of the individuals in the sample had a sanction imposed on them.
This seems high in comparison to the nation-wide annual average of about 5%,
but both figures are hard to compare. First, some of the individuals in our
sample have been in the welfare system for almost three years. Second, our
data are collected by sampling from an inflow, while the 5% figure relates to the
stock of welfare recipients. A large part of the stock has been in the welfare
system for several years and their sanction rate may be lower than for the welfare
recipients with a short duration. As mentioned in Section 2, welfare agencies are
more tolerant towards long-term welfare recipients. We thus expect the duration
dependence of the sanction rate to become negative after a while.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Parameter estimates
In this section we discuss the results of our empirical analysis. In the current sub-
section we present the parameter estimates, while in Subsection 5.2 we perform
sensitivity analyses.
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We estimate the parameters of our model using the method of Maximum
Likelihood. We take the unit of time to be a month. Furthermore, we specify the
piecewise constant duration dependence in terms of quarters. Thus, we estimate
the parameters vz, vi, $,  vi,  S,  X,,,  and X,,,  (t = 1,. . . , ll), pi,  p,,  p,,  @,  and
,i3,,  where both p, and p, are vectors of 21 parameters. We normalize by taking
x%l = X,,,  = 0. Because we do not observe transitions to work with an elapsed
duration in welfare in its 11th quarter, we do not estimate Xu,ll.
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates. The parameter estimates of p, and
p, are on the boundary of the parameter space, which implies that the unobserved
heterogeneity components of 8, and 8,  are perfectly correlated (p, = p, = 0). The
computed standard errors of all other parameters are conditional on this. Note
that v,”  > v: whereas v,”  < u,.b The perfect negative correlation between ZI,  and
u, implies that neglecting the endogenous selectivity in the imposition of the
sanctions would produce a downward bias in the estimate of 6. We return to
this in the next subsection. The estimates of p,  and p,  indicate that (ignoring
differences in observed characteristics) there are two groups of welfare recipients
which differ substantially in terms of job finding rate and sanction rate. The
group which represents 68% of the welfare recipients find a job rather quickly
and face a small sanction rate. The other group has a job finding rate that is
only 14%~  of that in the first group, while the sanction rate is 6 times higher than
that in the first group.
The main parameter of interest is 6,  which represents the effect of a sanction
on the exit rate from welfare to work. The estimated value of S is 0.89 and is
significantly different from 0. A sanction thus raises the transition rate from
welfare to work with about 140%,  so this transition rate more than doubles.
Perhaps surprisingly, our estimate is very close to the estimates in Abbring, Van
den Berg and Van Ours (1997) on sanction effects for UI recipients.g  Now one
may argue that a doubling of a small transition rate still gives a small transition
rate. However, our estimates do imply that a sanction imposed at a relatively
early stage in a welfare spell has a large effect on the probability of becoming
long-term dependent on welfare. Consider for example a 25-year old single-living
Dutch man who lives downtown and experiences his first welfare spell. Suppose
that his unobserved characteristics equal the mean values of 21,  and us in the
inflow, and suppose that exit to destinations other than work are ruled out. If
no sanctions are applied then his probability of leaving welfare within 2 years
*after  inflow is equal to 0.66. However, if the same individual would have had a
gFor example, their S estimates are 0.57 for UI recipients in the metal industry and 0.81 for
UI recipients in the banking sector; both are significant.
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sanction imposed after 6 months of welfare then the probability of leaving within
2 years increases to 0.88. Now consider a 50-year old individual who is otherwise
equal. If no sanctions are applied then his probability of leaving welfare within
2 years after inflow is equal to 0.29. If he would have been given a sanction after
6 months then this probability increases to 0.50.
It is thus clear that welfare recipients are sensitive to financial stimuli. Now
recall that the decrease in benefits associated with a sanction is often not very
large. To see why such a small change in benefits can have a large effect, note that
welfare recipients have a very low income level. Most of their benefits are spent
on the most elementary needs like housing, clothing and food. Moreover, given
the welfare system, there are no strong incentives for precautionary savings, and
given the length of an average welfare spell, there is no scope for consumption
smoothing to deal with the shock in income. In sum, the marginal utility levels
of the welfare recipients may be very high, and this may explain a large change
in behavior upon imposition of a sanction.
Now let us turn to the covariate effects on 8,. These are all significantly dif-
ferent from 0. Age, marital status and nationality seem to be the most important
covariates in the transition rate from welfare to work. This rate is lower for older,
unmarried and non-Dutch welfare recipients. It is interesting to pay some atten-
tion to the household characteristics, as they are closely related to the welfare
benefits level. Recall that a household with married members and no children
receives benefits that are much lower per person than what a single individual
receives, so one may expect someone in the former household to have a higher 19,
(note that someone who is married to a full-time employed person is in general
not entitled to welfare, so he would not be in our data). To check on this, note
that the estimated empirical effect of “married” depends on whether there are
children in the household. However, it turns out that in both cases the individ-
ual in the “married” household does have a higher 0,. Now consider the effect of
children. Having children increases the benefits level of unmarried recipients, so
one may expect this to decrease 0, (of course, having children may also increase
the non-pecuniary utility of being unemployed, and this is an additional reason
to expect a lower 0,).  It turns out that children do have a negative effect on 0,,
whether one is married or not. Note that if the individual is a single parent and
one of the children is below 12 years then he is not obliged to search for a job, so
then he is not in our data..
The duration dependence of 19,  is shown in Figure 1. Overall, the individual
transition rate from welfare to work decreases as the duration increases. (There
are slight increases after 3 months and after 18 months.) Apparently, stigmati-
zation and discouraged worker effects play a significant role.
The sanction rate rises during the first year of welfare, which is consistent with
the fact that the welfare agency needs some time to gather information on the
behavior of the welfare recipient. As indicated before most welfare recipients have
a first thorough investigation of their files after 8 months. If there is evidence
of noncompliance with job search guidelines then a sanction will imposed l-2
months later. This time pattern is reflected in Figure 2, where the sanction
rate has a peak at lo-12 months. After the first year the sanction rate has a
downward trend. This suggests that welfare agencies are more tolerant towards
long-term unemployed individuals (who have lower exit rates), or at least towards
individuals who are categorized in groups with a high expected unemployment
duration.‘O  The estimates of the covariate effects p, and p, provide other evidence
of this suggestion concerning the attitude of the welfare agencies. Age and gender
have significant effects on 0,  as well as on 8,,  and the signs of the two effects
are the same. This may of course be due to a systematic relation in behavior
across the two dimensions we consider, along the lines we discussed in Subsection
3.1. However, it may also indicate that whenever the decision has to be made
whether to impose a sanction or not, the agency takes the expected remaining
unemployment duration (or the exit rate) of the individual into account. If
an individual has a high expected remaining duration (e.g. if the individual
is old and/or female and/or long-term unemployed) then the agency may regard
a sanction to be morally less acceptable. In such a case, it may be expected
that it will be very difficult anyway for the individual to find a job soon, so that
the individual would have to bear the full weight of the sanction. Recall from
Section 2 that field research has provided evidence for this attitude of the welfare
agencies. Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997) find similar results for UI.
From an econometric point of view, this is selectivity from the side of the agency
imposing the sanctions.
It should be stressed, though, that this is not the whole story concerning the
behavior of welfare agencies. There are two other personal characteristics that
have a significant effect on the sanction rate, but these have an opposite effect
on the exit rate to work. In particular, married individuals and new welfare
recipients have a low sanction rate but a high exit rate to work. These may
simply be individuals who have a high search intensity because of certain values
of their structural parameters. In addition, new welfare recipients may have lower
* “The  latter explanation suggests a more complicated interaction between unobserved het-
erogeneity v, and duration dependence A,  in the sanction rate 8,,  but such a model would not
be identified.
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sanction rates because they do not have a history record yet.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection we examine the sensitivity of the parameter estimates with
respect to the model specification. i1 First of all, we test whether the unobserved
heterogeneity terms o,  and us are independent. Under the maintained assumption
that both terms are dispersed, the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test has a chi-square
distribution with one degree of freedom under the null hypothesis of indepen-
dence. Table 3 reports the estimation results for the model with independent
unobserved heterogeneity. The LR test statistic is equal to 14.7, indicating that,
indeed, selectivity in the imposition of sanctions is non-ignorable. Note that in
the restricted model we do not find any unobserved heterogeneity in the sanction
rate or the job finding rate. Also note that neglecting the (negative) relation
between the unobservable components leads to underestimation of the effect of a
sanction. Indeed, the sanction effect in Table 3 is insignificant.
We also perform sensitivity analyses with respect to the model specification
of the sanction effect. First, we allow the effect 6 of a sanction to vary over the
population, by specifying S = S(z)  = z’y. The vector z includes an intercept
and all explanatory variables used before, except for the district indicators, as
the number of sanctions per district is rather low. Table 4 gives the parameter
estimates for y. The LR test statistic on joint significance of all elements of y is
equal to 20.4. Since we have 10 additional parameters, we reject the null hypoth-
esis that the sanction effect is independent of individual characteristics, at the
5% level. This is actually in agreement to the theoretical model framework (see
Subsection 3.1), which predicts that the magnitude of the sanction effect depends
on the structural determinants like the discount rate, which may vary over indi-
viduals. Also, evaluations of training programs often find that the effect depends
on individual characteristics (Bonnal,  Fougere  and SQandon,  1997; Gritz, 1993).
Note that the only characteristic with a significant coefficient is whether one is
a new client. The sanction effect is larger for a new client than for a recurrent
welfare recipient.
So far we have assumed that once a sanction is imposed, it has a permanent
effect on the transition rate to work. We relax this assumption by allowing the
effect after expiration of the benefits reduction to differ from the effect during the
‘period of benefits reduction. Letting t, be the moment at which the sanction is
llWe focus on the estimates of the effect of a sanction. The other parameter estimates do
not change much from those reported in Subsection 5.1.
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imposed and t,  the moment at which the benefits reduction ends, we specify S as
S = 6, .I(t, < t < t,)  + 6,.  I(t,  < t). The duration t, -  t,  of the benefits reduction
differs across sanctions (see Section 2),  but in most cases it equals 1 month (602
cases) or 2 months (541 cases). It exceeds 2 months in only 13 casesI  Table
5 gives the parameter estimates of 6, and 6,.  Using a LR test, we reject the
null hypothesis that S,  = 6,. In fact, the effect after expiration of the benefits
reduction is somewhat larger than during the period of the reduction. From
a theoretical point of view this is puzzling. The benefits level increases upon
expiration, and the search intensity is not expected to increase at that moment
(see Subsection 3.1). A possible explanation is that in reality it takes some time
to adjust one’s behavior upon imposition of a sanction. Since the mean duration
te  - t,  of benefits reduction is relatively short, this may imply that most of the
adjustment occurs after expiration.13
The empirical model of Subsection 3.2 does not take into account that the
amount of benefits reduction differs across sanctions. We observe 669 sanctions
with a 5% reduction, 207 with lo%,  133 with 20% and 147 sanctions where
information on the magnitude is missing. The magnitude depends on the reason
for imposition of the sanction, so it is plausible that it is related to vu,.  We ignore
this additional selection problem, for the simple reason that we cannot correct for
it. Basically, we use all available information to deal with the selectivity in the
moment at which a sanction is imposed, and there is no additional information
to deal with the selectivity in the magnitude. We therefore estimate a model that
differs from the basic model merely because 6 now depends on the magnitude of
the benefits reduction. Specifically, let S,  be the effect in case of a reduction of
‘*It should be stressed that we neglect any selectivity involved in the choice of a particular
duration of the sanction. In reality, this duration depends on the reason for imposition of the
sanction. Welfare recipients who are confronted with a long duration t, - t, may be different
from those with a short duration.
r3We  also estimated a model extension in which 6 is specified as a flexible piecewise-constant
function of the elapsed duration t - t, since imposition of the sanction. This specification does
not take account of the expiration time, but it does allow the sanction effect to diminish slowly
as time proceeds. The estimation results (not presented here) are as follows. The estimated
unobserved heterogeneity distribution is basically such that either one never gets a sanction
and has a reasonably high transition rate from welfare to work, or one has a high rate of
getting a sanction and the transition rate from welfare to work is almost zero. The estimated
direct sanction effect is estimated to be extremely high for all values oft - t,. As a result, the
- second subgroup of individuals only leave unemployment after imposition of a sanction. These
estimation results are very implausible. It can be argued that this specification is so flexible
that it asks too much from the data. Note that this in turn suggests some caution concerning
the results in Table 5.
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z%, z = 5,10,20,  and S, the effect of a sanction where the magnitude is missing
in the database. Table 6 shows the parameter estimates of S,,  &,, S,,  and S, for
this extended model. The LR test does not reject the null hypothesis that S = S,
for all x = 5,10,20,0.
The sensitivity analyses above seem to indicate that the effect of a sanction
is not restricted to the period of benefits reduction. Furthermore, the amount of
benefits reduction seems to be unimportant for the sanction effect. This could be
taken as evidence that any pecuniary incentive of a sanction is dominated by non-
pecuniary factors14, setting aside for the moment the objection that the results
above can be affected by selectivity. However, a permanent effect works by way
of an increased search intensity, and this is most likely due to the combination
of increased monitoring and the threat of a severe punishment upon detection of
recidivism. Because of the latter, it could be argued that a permanent effect is at
least partly due to financial incentives. Moreover, insensitivity of the transition
rate to work with respect to the exact amount of benefits reduction can also be
explained if even a small decrease in welfare benefits causes the individual to
increase his search effort up to a physical maximum.
Now let us turn to sensitivity analyses concerning the labor market states
before and after welfare. First of all, recall from Section 2 that we restrict atten-
tion to welfare recipients who once lost a job, excluding school leavers on welfare.
However, estimation of the model with the joint data on both types of welfare
recipients does not affect the major conclusions. In particular, the estimate of
S is 0.63 (standard error 0.25), so it is significantly positive and only marginally
smaller than in Table 2. The number of observed sanctions for school leavers is
too small to estimate the full model separately for that group (some parameters
could not be estimated).
Concerning the destination states, recall that we treat exit to other desti-
nations than work as independent right-censoring of the duration until exit to
work. Relaxing this (e.g. by postulating a competing-risks model with poten-
tially related unobserved heterogeneity terms for each destination) would result
in estimates that are very sensitive to functional-form assumptions. We therefore
estimate a model extension in which we impose independence of the unobserved
heterogeneity terms. In particular, each transition rate to a destination state is
modeled by way of a MPH specification, where we allow each rate to depend on
whether a sanction has been imposed or not, but we do not allow for related
- unobserved heterogeneity terms. It turns out that sanctions do not have a sig-
14This  would be in line with Fortin  and Lacroix (1997),  who find for Canada that the level of
welfare has a negative but small effect on the individual transition rate from welfare to work.
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nificant effect on exit to the other destinations, except for leaving the city. This
suggests that some welfare recipients leave the city upon imposition of a sanction,
possibly to try to collect benefits in another municipality.
6 Conclusions
In The Netherlands, welfare recipients often stay unemployed for a long period
of time, even though they are obliged to comply with guidelines by the welfare
agency on search effort. Recipients who do not comply with these or with other
rules set by the agency may have a sanction imposed, i.e. their benefits may be
temporarily reduced. We find that the imposition of a sanction has a significant
positive effect on the transition rate from welfare to work. Indeed, this transition
rate is about twice as large after a sanction than before. This estimate (obtained
while correcting for selectivity) turns out to be very close to estimates reported
elsewhere on sanction effects for UI recipients. A sanction that is imposed at a
relatively early stage in a welfare spell thus has a substantial negative effect on
the probability of becoming long-term dependent on welfare.
This result establishes that welfare recipients are sensitive to financial stimuli.
Apparently, marginal utility levels of welfare recipients are so high, and consump-
tion smoothing is so difficult, that a relatively small sanction (and the threat of
an additional severe punishment in case of recidivism) can cause a large change
in search behavior. We also found some evidence that the effect of a sanction
varies with individual characteristics.
From the theoretical analysis it follows that individuals are expected to have
a higher transition rate to work in a system with sanctions even though they
have not (yet) been given a sanction. The estimated sanction effect is basically
a lower bound of the over-all effect of a welfare system with sanctions vis-a-vis
a system without sanctions. To quantify the “ex ante” effect of a system with
sanctions we would need to have additional data from a period with a welfare
system without sanctions. Alternatively, we would need sufficient information to
estimate a structural job search model.
2 2
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Exit observed unobserved Total
Sanction n o yes no yes
Individual characteristics
Age 18-25 43% 4% 41% 12% 3249
Age 26-35 35% 3% 50% 11% 2879
Age 36-45 26% 3% 60% 11% 1210
Age 46-55 22% 2% 67% 10% 533
Age 56-65 8% 1% 86% 5% 107
Male 37% 4% 46% 13% 5206
Female 34% 2% 56% 8% 2772
Not married 36% 3% 49% 11% 6542
Married 36% 3% 50% 11% 1436
Dutch 39% 3% 47% 10% 6034
Non-Dutch 26% 3% 57% 14% 1944
No children 39% 3% 46% 11% 6241
Children 26% 3% 60% 11% 1737
Collected welfare before 34% 4% 49% 14% 4399
New client 39% 3% 50% 8% 3579
Not married, no kids 38% 4% 47% 11% 5735
Married or kids 30% 3% 56% 10% 2243
Districts
Centrum 35% 3% 49% 13% 444
Delfshaven 34% 3% 51% 12% 1695
Kralingen/Crooswijk 43% 3% 43% 10% a79
Noord 40% 3% 47% 9% 805
Prins Alexander 45% 2% 46% 8% 437
Overschie 30% 3% 48% 13% 160
Hillegersberg/Schiebroek 44% 3% 45% 7% 203
Hoek van Holland 53% 9% 29% 9% 34
Charlois 36% 4% 51% 11% 1065
Feijenoord 28% 4% 53% 14% 1353
IJsselmonde 38% 1% 53% 7% 493
Hoogvliet 37% 3 %  4 9 % 11% 410
Total 36% 3% 49% 11% 7978
Explanatory note: The table shows how individuals with a certain characteristic are distributed over the four
groups defined by whether a transition from welfare to work is observed and whether a sanction is imposed
within the observed welfare spell. The last column gives the total number of individuals in the sample with a
certain characteristic.
. Table 1: Some characteristics of the data set.
25
Exit hazard Sanction hazard
& 8s
Effect of a sanction
6 0.89 (0.34) (
Unobserved heterogeneity
;f - 4 . 7 3  - 2 . 7 5 (0.14).32 - 5 . 0 0  - 3 . 2 1 (0.52) (0.27)
Pl 0.68 (0.24)
P4 0.32 (0.11) (
Duration deoendence
0
0.11 (0.057)
-0.041 (0.067)
-0.23 (0.079)
-0.28 (0.090)
-0.34 (0.10)
-0.28 (0.11)
-0.71 (0.13)
-0.75 (0.15)
-1.19 (0.21)
Individual chararcteristics
Age 26-35
Age 36-45
Age 46-55
Age 56-65
Female
Married
Non-Dutch
Children
New client
Married or kids
Districts
-0.77 (0.074)
-1.14 (0.11)
-2.25 (0.34)
-0.091 (0.049)
0.67 (0.11)
-0.64 (0.059)
-0.31 (0.10)
0.17 (0.043)
-0.36 (0.13)
0
0.25 (0.10)
0.41 (0.10)
0.45 (0.11)
0.021 (0.13)
-0.038 (0.14)
0.041 (0.15)
-0.32 (0.18)
-0.43 (0.22)
0.061 (0.23)
-1.05 (0.59)
-0.28 (0.076)
-0.41 (0.10)
-0.63 (0.15)
-1.47 (0.43)
-0.69 (0.090)
-0.43 (0.17)
0.034 (0.085)
0.039 (0.17)
-0.58 (0.080)
0.10 (0.21)
Delfshaven -0.11 (0 .099)  1 0 .0079  (0 .15 )
Kralingen/C. 0.25 iO.11) -0.17 (0.17)
Noord 0.14 (0.11) -0.24 (0.18)
Pr. Alexander 0.32 (0.12) -0.48 (0.21)
Overschie -0.16 (0.18) 0.021 (0.27)
Hillegersb./S. 0.30 (0.15) -0.39 (0.27)
Hoek v.H. 0.65 (0.34) 0.48 (0.53)
Charlois -0.0072 (0.11) -0.046 (0.16)
Feijenoord -0.22 (0.10) 0.15 (0.15)
I Jsselmonde 0.10 (0.12) -0.64 (0.21)
Hoogvliet -0.015 (0.13) -0.11 (0.20)
log 13 -20690.07
N 7978
. Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2: Estimation results of the basic model.
2 6
Exit hazard Sanction hazard
&I ea
Effect of a sanction
6 0.00095 (0.066) 1
Intercept
-3.07
Duration denendence
(0.090) 1 -4.02 (0.14)
0
0.078 (0.054)
-0.10 (0.060)
-0.31 (0.067)
-0.37 (0.072)
-0.45 (0.077)
-0.42 (0.080)
-0.87 (0.10)
-0.91 (0.12)
-1.36 (0.19)
-
0
0.28 (0.10)
0.46 (0.10)
0.50 (0.11)
0.075 (0.12)
0.024 (0.13)
0.11 (0.13)
-0.25 (0.16)
-0.35 (0.20)
0.14 (0.21)
-1.00 (0.598)
Individual chararcteristlcs
Age 26-35 -0.30 (0.041) 1 -0.33 (0.068)
Age 36-45 -0.69
Age 46-55 -1.04
Age 56-65 -2.12
Female -0.11
Married 0.60
Non-Dutch -0.57
Children -0.27
New client 0.14
(0.063) -0.50
(0.095) -0.74
(0.32) -1.58
(0.042) -0.64
(0.10) -0.33
(0.050) 0.043
(0.087) 0.037
(0.037) -0.51
(0.093)
(0.14)
(0.42)
(0.078)
(0.15)
(0.071)
(0.16)
(0.064)
Married or kids
Districts
-0.34 (0.12) 1 0.090 (0.19)
Delfshaven
Kralingen/C.
Noord
Pr. Alexander
Overschie
Hillegersb./S.
Hoek v.H.
Charlois
Feijenoord
I Jsselmonde
-0.092 (0.088)
0.21 (0.093)
0.11 (0.095)
0.27 (0.10)
-0.16 (0.16)
0.23 (0.13)
0.67 (0.25)
-0.0080 (0.093)
-0.19 (0.092)
0.071 (0.11)
Hoogvliet
log c
N
-0.028 (0.11)
-20697.44
7978
-0.025 (0.14)
-0.12 (0.15)
-0.20 (0.16)
-0.40 (0.20)
0.0056 (0.24)
-0.31 (0.24)
0.56 (0.45)
-0.062 (0.15)
0.088 (0.14)
-0.60 (0.20)
-0.080 (0.18)
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
. Table 3: Estimation results of the model where the selectivity in the process of
imposing sanctions in ignored.
2 7
Unobserved hc
va
Exit hazard 1 Sanction hazard 1 Effect of a sanction
erogeneity
-2.75 (0.16)  1 -4 .93 (0.63) 1
-4.49 (0.44) -3.21 (0.30)
0.69 (0.35) I
vb
P l
P 4 0.31 (0.16) 1
Duration depe lence
Xl 0
l-
x2 0.11 (0.057)
x3 -0.048 (0.067)
x4 -0.25 (0.080)
x5 -0.29 (0.090)
x6 -0.36 (0.10)
x7 -0.31 (0.11)
k3 -0.74 (0.13)
x9 -0.78 (0.15)
Xl0 -1.23 (0.21)
x11 -
Individual chararcteristics
Intercept
Age 26-35 -0.35 (0.050) -0.30
Age 36-45 -0.78 (0.076) -0.42
Age 46-55 -1.14 (0.11) -0.65
Age 56-65 -2.30 (0.35) -1.48
Female -0.090 (0.049) -0.68
Married 0.71 (0.11) -0.42
Non-Dutch -0.64 (0.060) 0.026
Children -0.33 (0.10) 0.034
New client 0.14 (0.044) -0.57
0
0.25 (0.10)
0.42 (0.11)
0.46 (0.11)
0.033 (0.14)
-0.025 (0.15)
0.057 (0.15)
-0.31 (0.18)
-0.41 (0.22)
0.082 (0.23)
-1.05 (0.59)
(0.076)
(0.10)
(0.15)
(0.43)
(0.091)
(0117)
(0.085)
(0.17)
(0.081)
0.44
0.12
0.44
0.27
1.64
-0.10
-0.73
0.19
0.38
0.39
(0.36)
(0.17)
(0.24)
(0.40)
(1.42)
(0.20)
(0.38)
(0.20)
(0.43)
(0.17)
Married or kids -0.39 (0.14) 1 0.10 (0.21) 1 0.46 (0.52)
Districts
Delfshaven -0.11 (0.097) 1 0.0078 (0.15) )
Kralingen/C. 0.23 (0.10) -0.16 (0.17)
Noord 0.13 (0.11) -0.23 (0.18)
Pr. Alexander 0.30 (0.12) -0.47 (0.21)
Overschie -0.16 (0.18) 0.020 (0.27)
Hillegersb./S. 0.28 (0.14) -0.38 (0.27)
Hoek v.H. 0.65 (0.33) 0.50 (0.54)
Charlois -0.018 (0.10) -0.044 (0.16)
Feijenoord -0.22 (0.10) 0.15 (0.15)
I Jsselmonde 0.091 (0.12) -0.64 (0.22)
Hoogvliet -0.022 (0.12) -0.11 (0.20)
log 13 -20679.89
N 7978
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
-Table 4: Estimation results of the model where the effect of a sanction is allowed
to depend on the observed individual characteristics.
2 8
Exit hazard ) Sanction haz,ard
kl 0s
Effect of a sanction
51 0.94 (0.35) (
52 1.39
Unobserved heterogeneity
;; - 2 . 7 2  - 5 . 0 8
Pl 0.68
(0.37) 1
(0.12)29 - 5 . 3 4  - 3 . 1 5 (0.43) (0.23)
(0.14)
0.12 (0.056)
-0.027 (0.066)
-0.22 (0.077)
-0.26 (0.087)
-0.32 (0.098)
-0.27 (0.10)
-0.69 (0.13)
-0.72 (0.15)
-1.17 (0.21)
X11
Individual chararcteristics
*goAge 36-45
Age 46-55
Age 56-65
Female
Married
Non-Dutch
Children
New client
Married or kids
Districts
Delfshaven
-0.36
-0.78
-1.16
-2.28
-0.085
0.69
-0.65
-0.32
0.17
(0.050)
(0.075)
(0.11)
(0.34)
(0.050)
(0.11)
(0.059)
(0.11)
(0.044)
P4 0.32 (0.066) (
Duration dependence
0
Kralingen/C.
Noord
Pr. Alexander
Overschie
Hillegersb./S.
Hoek v.H.
Charlois
Feijenoord
IJsselmonde
-0.36 (0.14) 0.11 (0.22)
-0.11 (0.10)
0.26 (0.11)
0.15 (0.11)
0.33 (0.13)
-0.15 (0.19)
0.33 (0.15)
0.65 (0.36)
-0.0054 (0.11)
-0.22 (0.11)
0.11 (0.12)
-0.0015 (0.13)
0.022 (0.16)
-0.17 (0.18)
-0.25 (0.18)
-0.48 (0.22)
0.023 (0.28)
-0.42 (0.27)
0.50 (0.57)
-0.033 (0.17)
0.18 (0.16)
-0.64 (0.21)
Hoogvliet
log L
N
-20687.63
7978
-0.12 (0.21)
L
1
0
0.25 (0.10)
0.40 (0.10)
0.45 (0.11)
0.018 (0.13)
-0.041 (0.14)
0.038 (0.15)
-0.33 (0.18)
-0.43 (0.22)
0.059 (0.23)
-1.08 (0.59)
-0.26 (0.079)
-0.38 (0.11)
-0.61 (0.15)
-1.44 (0.44)
-0.70 (0.091)
-0.45 (0.17)
0.051 (0.086)
0.058 (0.18)
-0.60 (0.080)
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
.
Table 5: Estimation results of the model where the effect of a sanction is split
into an effect during the sanction and an effect afterwards.
2 9
Exit hazard Sanction hazard
e., es
Effect of a sanction
65 0.95 ( 0 . 3 5 )
610 0 . 6 7 ( 0 . 3 9 )
620 0.91 (0.41)
60 0 . 9 9 (0.39) 1
Unobserved heteroeeneitv
- -2 .7 ; (0.14) -5.02 (0.53)
-4.43 (0.31) -3.21 (0.27)
Pl 0.68 (0.23)
P4 0.32 (0.11)
Duration dependence
Xl 0 0
x2 0.11 (0.057) 0.25 (0.10)
x3 -0.041 (0.067) 0.41 (0.10)
x4 -0.24 (0.079) 0.45 (0.11)
x5 -0.28 (0.090) 0.021 (0.13)
J6 -0.34 (0.10) -0.038 (0.14)
x7 -0.28 (0.11) 0.041 (0.15)
h7 -0.71 (0.13) -0.32 (0.18)
x9 -0.74 (0.15) -0.43 (0.22)
x10 -1.18 (0.21) 0.062 (0.23)
x11 - -1.05 (0.59)
Individual chararcteristics
Age 26-35
Age 36-45
Age 46-55
Age 56-65
Female
Married
Non-Dutch
Children
New client
Married or kids
Districts
Delfshaven
Kralingen/C.
Noord
Pr. Alexander
Overschie
Hillegersb./S.
Hoek v.H.
Charlois
Feijenoord
I Jsselmonde
Hoogvliet
log c
N
-0.35 (0.049)
-0.77 (0.074)
-1.14 (0.11)
-2.25 (0.34)
-0.091 (0.049)
0.67 (0.11)
-0.64 (0.059)
-0.31 (0.10)
0.17 (0.044)
-0.36 (0.13)
0.25 (0.11)
0.14 (0.11)
0.32 (0.12)
-0.16 (0.18)
0.31 (0.15)
0.65 (0.34)
-0.0050 (0.11)
-0.22 (0.10)
0.10 (0.12)
-0.011 (0.13)
-20689.12
7978
-0.28 (0.076)
-0.41 (0.10)
-0.63 (0.15)
-1.47 (0.43)
-0.69 (0.090)
-0.43 (0.17)
0.034 (0.085)
0.039 (0.17)
-0.58 (0.080)
0.10 (0.21)
0.0093 (0.15)
-0.17 (0.17)
-0.24 (0.18)
-0.47 (0.22)
0.021 (0.27)
-0.39 (0.27)
0.49 (0.54)
-0.045 (0.16)
0.15 (0.16)
-0.64 (0.22)
-0.11 (0.21)
- Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses
Table 6: Estimation results of the model where the effect of a sanction is allowed
to depend on the magnitude of the sanction.
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Figure 1: Duration dependence of the transition rate from welfare to work.
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Figure 2: Duration dependence of the sanction rate.
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